We study the macroeconomic e¤ects of rational asset bubbles in an overlappinggenerations economy where asset trading requires specialised …nanciers and where agents freely choose between working in the production or in the …nancial sector. Frictions in the market for deposits create rents in the …nancial sector that a¤ect workers' choice of occupation. When rents are large, the private gains associated with asset bubbles may lead too many workers to become speculators, thereby causing rational bubbles to lose their e¢ ciency properties. Moreover, if speculation can be carried out by skilled labor only then asset bubbles raise income and consumption inequalities, to the bene…t of the skilled and the detriment of the unskilled.
Introduction
The concern that the bubble on housing, securised mortgages and related derivatives in the 2000s may have distorted labor allocation to the bene…t of the …nancial sector and to the detriment of productive and innovative activities, expressed in President Obama's speech, also re ‡ects the view of many professional economists, …nancial columnists and business leaders. 1 The prospect of large payo¤s from trading assets, risky loans and derivatives, the story goes, would have diverted scarce human resources (especially skilled labor) into the …nancial sector. 2 The presence of speculative bubbles is a striking feature of periods where the …nancial sector attracted many skilled workers. In the end of the 1920s and in the recent period, bubbles on housing and related assets have accompanied the expansion of the …nancial sector. These events induce many people to consider that the expansion of the …nancial sector sustained by asset bubbles is bad for the economy. However, it turns out that this issue is not so simple, because asset bubbles may also have bene…cial consequences. Periods of expansion of the …nancial sector are accompanied by extreme asset valuations that facilitate the emergence of bubbles, but also by vigorous economic expansion (Caballero et al., 2006) .
Macroeconomic analysis shows that rational bubbles can be e¢ cient (Tirole, 1985 , Weil, 2008 . Actually, despite the complexity of the relations between …nancial bubbles, the size of the …nancial sector and economic e¢ ciency, little is known on this issue that has not been yet analyzed in a consistent framework which accounts for the potential gains and losses associated with bubbles. The aim of this paper is to contribute to …ll this gap.
We study the macroeconomic e¤ects of rational bubbles in an economy where …rm …-nancing and asset trading require specialized intermediation services provided by …nanciers.
There is a 'production sector', a '…nancial sector', and agents choose freely the sector where they work. Market frictions, which limit the possibility to meet trading partners, induce rents which in ‡uence the allocation of labor. 3 In this framework, asset bubbles are accompanied by expansions of the …nancial sector. Nevertheless, asset bubbles are e¢ cient when rents in the …nancial sector are su¢ ciently small, because …nanciers must pass on to lenders much of the productive gains associated with rational bubbles. In that case, asset bubbles, although associated with a large …nancial sector, may be dynamically e¢ cient. When rents in the …nancial sector are large, however, bubbles attract so many workers in that sector that the bubbly equilibrium loses its e¢ ciency properties. In this situation, while the …rst generations always bene…t from the early stages of the bubble, the misallocation of labor eventually becomes so severe that all generations born after a certain date are worse o¤ in the bubbly equilibrium. We also show that asset bubbles increase the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers. Actually, the development of the …nancial sector in the nineties has been accompanied by a huge increase in top wages 4 in a context where the …nancial sector uses mainly skilled workers who can choose between becoming a "manager"or a "…nancier", while most less educated people have industry-speci…c skills and cannot easily become …nancier.
Accordingly, we extend our basic model to account for "unskilled"individuals, stuck into the productive sector, and "skilled"individuals who can choose to work in the …nancial or in the 3 Philippon and Reshef (2008) …nd that …nancial jobs were relatively skill intensive, complex, and highly paid until the 1930s and after the 1980s, but not in the interim period. They argue that the deregulation of the …nancial sector, which began in the 1980s, has been accompanied by the development of complex …nancial products, by increases in the demand for skills in …nancial jobs, and by the creation of substantial rents in the …nancial sector. Philippon and Reshef estimate that rents accounted for 30 percent to 50 percent of the wage di¤erential between the …nancial sector and the rest of the private sector in the beginning of the 2000s. Philippon (2008) claims that the …nancial sector, which accounts for 8 percent of GDP in 2006, is probably at least 2 percent above the size required by …nancial intermediation. 4 Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2010), Piketty and Saez (2003) .
productive sector. In this framework, asset bubbles attract skilled workers in the …nancial sector, reduce the supply of skilled labor in the productive sector and then raise the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers. The ‡ight of skilled workers from the production sector into the …nancial sector reduces the marginal productivity of unskilled workers, then their wage and their consumption. We …nd that this phenomenon may induce asset bubbles bene…cial to skilled workers to be detrimental to unskilled workers when market frictions in the …nancial sector are large.
Our paper is related to at least four strands of research.
First, there is a large (and still growing) literature on the existence, dynamics and e¢ -ciency properties of rational bubbles (see, for example, Caballero et al., 2006, and Fahri and Tirole, 2008 , for recent contributions on this topic). But to the best of our knowledge none of the existing work speci…cally pertains to the relationship between bubbles and the size of the …nancial sector. As is well known, in the baseline OLG model of Diamond (1965) , where the only friction lies in the demographic structure that prevents agents from participating in all markets, asset bubbles improve welfare (relative to the bubbleless equilibrium) by providing agents with the additional store of values necessary to transfer wealth across periods (see Tirole, 1985 , and Weil, 1987 , 1989 . Asset bubbles can be ine¢ cient, though, when other market imperfections such as capital externalities are added to the OLG structure. For example, Saint-Paul (1992) and Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) show that the crowding out of the capital stock by the bubble loses its e¢ ciency properties under endogenous growth as it lowers growth and the welfare of future generations. Relatedly, Olivier (2000) constructs a model in which households optimally allocate their time endowment between production and research; in this context, bubbles on …rms'share favor …rm creation and may raise long-run growth. Our paper di¤ers from these three latter studies by ignoring external e¤ects, and is thus closer to the basic (exogenous growth) framework of Diamond, Tirole and Weil. In contrast to Olivier, we focus on the allocation of labor between production and …nancial intermediation, thereby uncovering a novel source of ine¢ ciency associated with rational bubbles.
Second, the contributions of Philippon ( , 2008 analyze the determinants of the size of the …nancial sector in a model where …nanciers provide monitoring services to entrepreneurs facing borrowing constraints. His framework is very useful to explain historical variations in the income share of the US …nancial sector and also to study the consequences of corrective taxes when the allocation of human capital across the …nancial and the non …nancial sectors is ine¢ cient. However, the consequences of asset bubbles have not been explored in this framework.
Third, some authors have analyzed the ine¢ cient allocation of talents that may follow from the presence of rents. For example, Baumol (1990) draws on historical evidence to argue that the allocation of entrepreneurial resources in society primarily re ‡ects the distribution of individual, rather than economywide, payo¤s and may thus be socially ine¢ cient. In a related contribution, Murphy et al. (1991) construct a model of occupational choice and show how private returns may draw the marginal talent into rent-seeking, with the consequence of slowing down economic growth. While these authors explicitly refer to "trading" and "speculation"as prominent rent-seeking activities, they do not speci…cally study the role of bubbles in attracting talents into the …nancial sector and the potential drain that may result for productive sectors.
Fourth, there is large literature that sheds light on the interactions between …nancial market imperfections and macroeconomic activity (see Tirole, 2005 , for a survey). The papers the most related to our approach are those of Wasmer and Weil (2004) , who introduce search frictions on the credit market, and those of Femminis (2002) and Sen (2002) who analyze rational bubbles when there is imperfect competition on the product market. But none of these papers study the interactions between asset bubbles, frictions in the market for deposits, and the allocation of labor.
Our paper is organized as follows. The basic model with frictions in the …nancial sector is presented in Section 1. The bubbleless and the bubbly equilibria are presented in Sections 2 and 3 respectively. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the dynamic e¢ ciency of the bubbly equilibrium. Section 5 deals with the relations between asset bubbles and income inequality. Section 6 provides concluding comments.
The model
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of two period-lived, risk-neutral agents who maximize end-of-life consumption. N t agents are born at date t, and the population grows at rate n 0. Every agent is endowed with one unit of labor when young. A newly born agent chooses between working in the production sector or entering the …nancial sector, and we denote by L t the number of "workers"in the population at date t (so that N t L t is the number of "…nanciers" in the population). The central di¤erence between workers and …nanciers is in the technologies that they have access to. There are two goods: labor, and a numeraire good, which is produced, invested and consumed.
Technologies
The numeraire good is produced with a constant returns to scale technology, 
the production function in intensive form, pro…t maximization by the …rm yields:
In what follows we refer to 1 + r t as the (gross) "productive" rate, as opposed to the "interest rate" that …nanciers promise to workers, which we denote by 1 + t . Henceforth we will focus on the non trivial case where the gross productive rate is strictly larger than the returns on the storage technology.
6 5 This assumption is made for the sake of simplicity. It can easily be checked that our qualitative results remain unchanged if the marginal cost of transforming one unit of saving into one unit of capital is positive but su¢ ciently small. 6 The conditions ensuring that this will indeed be the case in equilibrium are given below.
Labor allocation
Agents choose their occupation (or sector) according to the terminal consumption that they expect from working in either sector. Occupation choice is made at the beginning of life.
It is irreversible. In equilibrium, free entry in both sectors will ensure that expected payo¤s are equalized and will determine the equilibrium size of each sector. We assume that there are market frictions in the …nancial sector, which allow …nanciers to earn a positive unit intermediation margin and thus …nd this occupation worthwhile.
The …nancial sector
After workers have decided to engage in the production sector, they start looking for a …nancier to whom they will lend their wage income at the end of the period. They are randomly matched with …nanciers according to a standard urn model where each worker has one ball and each …nancier an urn. A worker looking for a …nancier sends his ball at random among the urns. In this framework, a worker can be matched at most with one …nancier at the same time. The number of customers of a …nancier is a random variable that follows a
Poisson distribution with parameter`t= (1 `t).
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After the match has taken place, the worker and the …nancier bargain over the joint surplus to be earned from the relationship, and we denote by~ 2 (0; 1) the share of the surplus that accrues to a …nancier in a particular match. Importantly, the monopolistic power of the …nancier at this stage is limited by the fact that workers can decline the deal and restart searching for a …nancier (with the same random matching process); however, for time constraints they can only search for a …nite number of times 1. We show in Appendix A that the outcome of this random matching and bargaining process is the following: i) workers strike a deal with the …rst …nancier that they meet; ii) the interest rate on which they agree to deal is:
where ~ 2 (0; 1). In the remainder of the paper we shall refer to the composite parameter as the market power of …nanciers. This market power can be high (low) either because 7 The probability that a …nancier receives a ball sent by one worker is 1=(N t L t ): Then, the probability that a …nancier receives b balls sent by L t workers is
This binomial distribution converges towards the Poisson distribution with parameter
and N t L t are su¢ ciently large, so that the probability to receive b balls is e their bargaining power in a particular match,~ , is high (low), and/or because lenders'ability to meet alternative trading partners, as measured by , is high (low). Equation (3) expresses the interest rate as a weighted sum of the returns on the two underlying technologies, storage and production. When …nanciers enjoy much market power, they are able to keep the interest rate accruing to workers close to the relatively low storage return (that is, the ultimate outside option for workers). On the contrary, when …nanciers have little market power their rent is limited and the interest rate must remain close to the relatively high productive rate.
It is convenient to rewrite (3) in terms of the intermediation margin that …nanciers are able to extract from their matches with workers:
In equation (4), the return di¤erence 1 + r t+1 is the economywide surplus, per unit of savings, from investing in the production sector rather than storing. Then, the intermediation margin r t+1 t+1 is the fraction of this unit surplus that accrues to …nanciers.
Occupational choice
Agents born at date t must choose at beginning of date t whether to become a worker or a …nancier, on the basis of the expected date t + 1 consumption from either occupation. The terminal consumption of a worker born at date t who lends his savings to …nanciers is:
Let us now turn to …nanciers. Their payo¤ from any match is w t (r t+1 t+1 ). Since they are in number N t L t while workers are in number L t , and given the assumed matching process, the expected number of matches for a potential …nancier is`t= (1 `t). Hence the total expected consumption from choosing a career in …nance is:
Note that (6) is the expected consumption of an agent considering to become a …nancier, while the actual (ex post) consumption level of a particular …nancier depends on his random realized number of matches.
The equilibrium allocation of labor across sectors is determined by free entry. Since agents are risk-neutral, they must get the same expected consumption from either occupation, so
In what follows we may thus refer to c t+1 as "individual consumption", de…ned as aggregate consumption divided by the number of old agent at date t + 1, i.e., N t+1 . Equating (5) and (6) and using (4), we …nd that the equilibrium share of the …nancial sector is:
which is positive provided that gross productive rate, 1 + r t+1 ; is larger than the storage return, .
The interpretation of equation (7) is straightforward: when the market power of …nancier,
, is small, then so is the intermediation margin they are able to extract (see equation (4)) and thus the attractiveness of the …nancial sector. If, on the contrary, is large (i.e., …nanciers have strong market power), then the large implied margin attracts many agents into the …nancial sector ex ante and hence the number of workers in the production sector is small.
A version of the basic overlapping generations model of Diamond (1965) and Tirole (1985) is recovered as a particular case of our framework when we set = 0, in which case`t = 1 for all t. At the extreme opposite, the crowding out of human resources by the …nancial sector is maximum when = 1, in which case`t = = (1 + r t+1 ). Similarly, changes in lenders' outside option, , alter the rent that …nanciers can extract and thus the equilibrium size of the …nancial sector.
The e¤ect of the productive rate, 1 + r t+1 , on labor allocation across sectors also has a straightforward interpretation. Financiers extract a rent from their exclusive access to …rms' …nancing. When the productive rate increases, matched …nanciers are able to extract some of the additional payo¤ and hence the intermediation margin rises. This in turns raises the expected payo¤ from working in the …nancial sector and reduces the share of producers in the population. Unsurprisingly, this e¤ect is scaled by the market power of …nanciers, as well as producers'outside investment opportunities, since they both determine how much of the extra surplus …nanciers can extract from an increase in the productive rate.
2 Bubbleless equilibrium
Aggregate dynamics and steady state
In the bubbleless equilibrium workers'savings transit through …nanciers'hands and are then entirely turned into …rms'capital. Since workers save their entire wage income, the law of motion for capital is K t+1 = w t L t , which we may rewrite as:
On the other hand, equations (2) and (7) relate current occupational choices to the productive rate, and hence to the stock of capital per producer in the next period:
Equations (8) and (9) de…ne, together with the initial value of capital, k 0 ; the equilibrium path of (k t ;`t). It should be noticed that in contrast to capital, the share of …nanciers is forward-looking because current occupational choices depend on anticipated payo¤s and hence on the interest rate that will prevail in the next period. In equation (9),`t is increasing in k t+1 =`t +1 since a high value of the latter ratio is associated with a low productive rate, which deters agents from working in the …nancial sector and thus raises the size of the productive sector. Note also that in the particular case where = 0, equation (9) yields t = 1 and hence from (8) the path of k t is described by the univariate (Diamond-like) dynamics k t+1 = !(k t )= (1 + n). When > 0, on the contrary, the stock of capital and the allocation of labor across sectors are jointly determined according to (8)- (9).
Let us denote by k and` the steady state values of capital per worker and the size of the production sector, respectively, in the bubbleless equilibrium. From (8)- (9) we get:
where (k=`) !(k=`)= (k=`) : We now make the following assumptions:
Assumption (A1) ensures that the steady state de…ned by (10) exists and is unique. (A2) guarantees that in the bubbleless steady state the value of the productive rate (left hand side) is always greater than the storage return (right hand side); this will imply that in the vicinity of that steady state there will always be a range of interest rates, t , allowing …nanciers to extract a positive intermediation margin (i.e., r t+1 t+1 > 0) while still be able to attract lenders'deposits (i.e., t+1 > ).
Note from (10) that output per worker in the bubbleless steady state, Y =N , is y =
Since under assumption (A2) the share of the population engaged in production,` , decreases with the market power of …nanciers, , higher values of reduce output per worker. Finally, from (5) and (10) individual consumption in the bubbleless steady state is given by:
and thus decreases with ; the market power of …nanciers.
Stability and local dynamics
We focus on the behavior of the dynamic system in the vicinity of the steady state (k ;` ) :
Log-linearizing (8)- (9) around (k ;` ) generates a two-dimensional linear system, the stability of which depends on the number of characteristic roots inside the unit circle and the number of predetermined variables in the system (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980). We show in Appendix B that the characteristic polynomial summarizing the local dynamics of the bubbleless equilibrium has either one or two roots inside the unit circle. Since the system has one predetermined variable (k t ) and one free variable (`t), this implies that either there is a unique equilibrium trajectory converging towards (k ;` ) and indexed by k 0 (determinacy), or this equilibrium is surrounded by an in…nity of equilibrium trajectories converging towards (k ;` ) and indexed by (k 0 ;`0) (indeterminacy). More precisely, we …nd that the bubbleless steady state is determinate if and only if:
where 2 (0; 1) and > 0 denote the elasticity of the real wage and (minus) that of the productive rate with respect to capital, respectively, evaluated at the bubbleless steady state:
Condition (12) is not strong. For example, it is satis…ed for all feasible values of the other parameters in the Cobb-Douglas case, where y = k and hence = , as long as 1=3. It is also satis…ed for any value of when 1=2. In any case, it is satis…ed provided that the return on storage, ; lies su¢ ciently below the gross productive return f 0 ( 1 (1 + n))+1 .
In the remainder of the paper we shall work out the dynamics of the model for the case where
Bubbly dynamics
Bubbleless dynamics
Figure 1: Bubbly and bubbleless equilibria condition (12) is satis…ed, so that k 0 uniquely pins down`0 and sets the economy on the unique equilibrium trajectory converging towards (k ;` ). However, since our results on the welfare impact of rational bubbles follow from the asymptotic properties of the bubbly equilibrium and that indeterminacy also implies convergence towards the steady state, this focus is for expositional clarity and should not be seen as essential in our analysis.
Under condition (12) the local dynamics of k t in the bubbleless equilibrium is governed by the unique stable root of the system, denoted by p 1 , and we have (see Appendix B for details):
This dynamics is represented in Figure 1 . Given k t , equation (14) determines k t+1 .
3 Bubbly equilibrium
Dynamics and steady state
We now derive the bubbly equilibrium of our economy and compare it to the bubbleless equilibrium. We assume that bubbles, like claims to the capital stock, can only be traded by …nanciers. In the bubbly equilibrium, young …nanciers buy useless pieces of paper from the old …nanciers against the numeraire good that they have borrowed from young workers. For expositional clarity we focus on "pure" bubbles with no underlying real asset, but it would be straightforward to introduce a tree with constant payo¤ and to interpret the bubble as the di¤erence between the trading price of this tree and its fundamental value (as in Tirole, 1985) . Moreover, we only study equilibria that are "asymptotically bubbly", that is, equilibria in which the bubble per worker has strictly positive steady state value. We make speci…c assumption below ensuring the existence of such equilibrium paths, along which the bubble per worker does not vanish asymptotically.
In the bubbly equilibrium, total savings are invested in the production technology as well as in the bubble, i.e.,
Denoting by b t = B t =N t the value of the bubble per young agent at the end of date t, we have:
On the other hand, the absence of arbitrage opportunities requires that from the point of view of …nanciers the return on trading the bubble be equal to that on investing in production, i.e., B t+1 = (1 + r t+1 ) B t . From (2), we must thus have:
Along an asymptotically bubbly equilibrium the steady state value of the bubble per worker is constant and positive, implying that the ratio in (16) is equal to one. From (7) and (15)- (16) 
The necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of an equilibrium with asymptotically positive asset bubble is
Assumption (A1)) and 1 + n = (k =` ) (see (10) ), steady state bubbles will exist if and
i.e., if and only if the bubble asymptotically crowds out capital per worker in the productive sector. Equivalently, steady state bubbles are possible if and only if the real interest rate is higher at the bubbly steady state than at the bubbleless one, i.e.,
Hence we can make sure that asymptotically bubbly equilibria exist by making the following assumption:
For example, if the production function is f (k) = k ; this condition boils down to n+ >
(1 + n)=(1 ).
Note …rst that even though the existence of a steady state with positive bubble is related to the production technology, to the population growth rate and to the rate of depreciation, it does not depend on the market power of …nanciers. However, the size of the bubble per worker depends on`b and thus on . Second, the higher productive rate that prevails in the bubbly steady state (relative to that in the bubbleless steady state) is associated with a more attractive …nancial sector and hence a smaller size of the production sector, i.e.,`b <` .
Finally, since k b =`b < k =` while`b <` , it follows that k b < k , i.e., the bubble crowds out capital per worker. We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For all feasible values of the bubbly steady state has lower capital per worker, k, greater productive rate, f 0 (k=`) + 1 , and a larger …nancial sector, 1 `, than the bubbleless steady state.
The impact of general equilibrium asset bubbles on the capital stock and the rental rate in the long run are well known since the work of Tirole (1985) and Weil (1987) . The novelty here is that di¤erences in capital per worker between the bubbly and the bubbleless equilibria a¤ect occupational choices (through their impact on the productive rate) and thus the allocation of labor across sectors. Finally, from (5) and (17) individual consumption in the bubbly steady state is given by:
and hence decreases with the market power of …nanciers, .
Stability and local dynamics
We proceed as in Section 2.2 and derive the dynamics of the system in the vicinity of the bubbly steady state. Moreover, since we wish to compare equilibrium trajectories that, for a particular level of initial capital k 0 , may converge towards either the bubbleless steady state or the bubbly steady state, we assume that they are close to each other. We can then show (see Appendix C for details) that the steady state (k b ;`b; b) is determinate provided that condition (12) is satis…ed, implying that the bubbly equilibrium (k t ;`t; b t ) is locally unique.
As is shown in Appendix C, around the bubbly steady states the dynamics of the capital stock can be …rst-order approximated as follows:
wherep 1 is the (unique) stable root of the bubbly system. Equation (19) 
Dynamic e¢ ciency
In the limit case where the …nancial sector is perfectly competitive (i.e., = 0), the size of the …nancial sector is zero and our model collapses into a version of Diamond's (1969) .
Consequently, the standard results applies that rational bubbles can exist only to the extend that they restore dynamic e¢ ciency (Tirole, 1985) . The question that we ask here is: Do bubbles keep their e¢ ciency properties when the market power of …nanciers allows them to seize part of the free lunch generated by bubbles?
It would seem, at …rst sight, that the answer should be "yes": since the bubbly equilibrium is associated with a higher productive rate than the bubbleless equilibrium, and that the overall surplus associated with this higher rate is shared between …nanciers and workers, agents in both sectors should bene…t (or at least not su¤er) from the bubble. In short, it would seem that the size of rent extraction by the …nancial sector should a¤ect the way the e¢ ciency gains associated with the bubble are shared amongst agents, but not the dynamic e¢ ciency of the bubble per se.
This reasoning is wrong, however, for it ignores the e¤ects of rent extraction by the …nancial sector on occupational choices and the implied distortion in the allocation of labor (11) and (18) give Proof. We must compare c ( ) (de…ned by equation (11)) and c b ( ) (given by equation (18) Tirole economy (which we recover when = 0). The second inequality is equivalent to The opposite occurs in the short-run. Indeed, use (5) and (9) to write the consumption of workers born at date 0 as follows:
Since ! 0 (k=`) > 0 while k 0 is given this last equation implies that consumption of individuals born at date 0 decreases with the size of the productive sector,`0: We can then
show that the size of the productive sector at date zero is smaller in the bubbly equilibrium than in the bubbleless equilibrium, so that the consumption of individuals born at date zero is always higher in the bubbly equilibrium than in the bubbleless equilibrium. This can be proven by contradiction. First, let us de…ne the variable x t k t =`t, so thatx t =k t ^t , and note that for k 0 = k we have x 1 = k 0 =` 0 = x in the bubbleless equilibrium. 9 In the bubbly equilibrium, we have x 10 Now, suppose that`b 0 >` 0 . From equation (9) , this would imply that x b 1 > x , that is,
We know from equation ( consumption may at all dates be higher in the bubbly equilibrium than in the bubbleless equilibrium (this situation is depicted in the left hand panel of Figure 3 ); when such is the case, the standard result that the bubbly equilibrium is dynamically e¢ cient while the bubbleless equilibrium is not applies. However, when > , c b ( ) lies below c ( ) and the bubbly equilibrium is bound to lose its welfare-improving properties (right hand panel of Figure 3 ). To summarize, when the initial stock of capital is close to the steady state value of the bubbleless equilibrium, the bubbly path is associated with higher consumption per worker in the short run, but bubbles reduce welfare in the long run when the market power of …nanciers is too large.
Asset bubble and income inequalities
In this section, we study the impact of bubbles on income inequality. In the model developed up to now, all individuals could become …nancier. Actually, bubble-prone economies seem to be associated with complex …nancial systems needing professionals whose skills are transferable across sectors (i.e., so that they can freely choose between becoming a "managers"or a "banker"), while less educated people have industry-speci…c skills and cannot easily become …nancier. Therefore, we introduce "unskilled" individuals, stuck into the productive sector, while "skilled" individuals can (like those of the previous sections) become …nancier. This distinction allows us to show that skilled individuals can bene…t more from asset bubbles than unskilled people. The bubble triggers a ‡ight of skilled workers from the production whichk t =p 1kt 1 and^t = k t , where is a constant. This implies thatx t+1 =p 1xt , and hence x 
Labor allocation under skill heterogeneity
There are N t skilled households and L u;t = uN t unskilled households in the population (hence total population is now (1 + u) N t ). We now use L t to denote the number of skilled workers engaged in production. With this notation, which allows us to directly generalize the previous model,`t = L t =N t and 1 `t are now the shares of skilled workers engaged in production and …nance, respectively, while skilled and unskilled workers are in proportion 1= (1 + u) and u= (1 + u) in the population, respectively. Similarly, we now use w t to denote the wage of skilled workers and w u;t that of unskilled workers.
Production now requires both labor types, and for simplicity we assume that the production function is of the form:
or, in intensive form, y t = k t` t , with Au
1
. First, equating the marginal product of capital to the user cost of capital gives the following gross productive rate:
Second, equating the marginal product of each labor type to the corresponding real wages, we …nd that the equilibrium skill premium in this economy is:
Finally, since`t 2 [0; 1] we can make sure that skilled workers always earn a higher wage than unskilled workers by assuming that
If (A4) did not hold, unskilled labor could be so scarce, and consequently well remunerated in equilibrium, that skilled workers would prefer to go for unskilled jobs in the productive sector than working in the …nancial sector; this would lead the size of the latter to shrink to zero.
Equation (23) indicates that the skill premium is increased as the share of skilled workers in the productive sector goes down. In other words, increases in the size of the …nancial sector raise wage inequalities. This occurs for two reasons. First, for a given quantity of capital and unskilled labor in production, a reduction in the availability of skilled labor in that sector raises its relative price, w t . Second, a lower level of skilled labor in the productive sector reduces the productivity of unskilled labor and hence the corresponding real wage, w u;t .
As is shown in Appendix A, the bargaining outcome that generates the equilibrium interest rate, t+1 , as a function of the productive rate, r t+1 , is independent of the size of individual savings brought to the …nancier (equal to w t or w u;t here); hence equations (3)- (4) also apply to the economy with two labor types and uniquely determines the interest rate t+1 . We denote by c u;t+1 = w u;t (1 + t+1 ) and c t+1 = w t (1 + t+1 ) the terminal consumption of an unskilled worker and that of a skilled worker engaged in production, respectively. There are N t L t …nanciers, who extract the intermediation margin r t+1 t+1 and meet depositors according to the same random matching process as before. For any particular …nancier, the expected number of matches with skilled worker engaged in production is`t= (1 `t), while any match with a skilled leads to a deposit collection of w t . On the other hand, the expected number of matches with unskilled workers is u= (1 `t), while any match with an unskilled worker leads to the collection of w ut units of savings. Hence, using (23) we …nd that the (expected) terminal consumption of a skilled worker in the …nancial sector is:
which generalizes equation (6) above.
Since by assumption the demand for unskilled labor by the …nancial sector is zero, the absence of arbitrage opportunities across alternative career choices applies to skilled workers only. Equating c t+1 and E t (c f t+1 ), we …nd that in equilibrium the share of skilled workers choosing to work in the …nancial sector is
which generalizes equation (7) above. It is easy to check from (24) that @`t=@r t+1 < 0, that is, a higher productive rate attracts more skilled workers into …nance, due to the greater intermediation margin to be earned there. Taken together, equations (23) and (24) indicate that a higher productive rate will be associated with a greater skill premium. Moreover, since the interest rate is the same for all workers, we have c t+1 =c u;t+1 = w t =w u;t , so that wage inequalities are directly re ‡ected into consumption inequalities.
Bubbleless equilibrium
Using the expressions for w t and w s;t derived from (21) and rearranging, we …nd that total
In the bubbleless equilibrium all these savings are invested into next period's capital stock, K t+1 . Hence the capital accumulation equation
can be written as:
The dynamics of the bubbleless equilibrium is described by a two-dimensional system formed by the labor allocation equation (24) (with the productive rate r t+1 given by (22)) and the capital accumulation equation (25) .
We solve the model with skill heterogeneity in the same way as we solved the basic model.
We …rst compute the steady state of the bubbleless equilibrium. It will then be compared to the bubbly analogue, with particular attention being paid to asymptotic levels of capital and consumption per worker. Second, we examine the local stability of this equilibrium to show that it exists and is unique under condition (12) . This second step is detailed in Appendix C.
From equations (22) and (25), the value of the productive rate at the bubbleless steady state is:
The steady state value of the other variables can then be computed sequentially: the share of skilled labor in production,` , is uniquely determined by (24) and the value of r , while capital per worker, k ; can be computed from r and` using (22) . Finally, note that assumption (A2) is still assumed to hold here, i.e., (1 + n) = (1 ) + 1 > :
Bubbly equilibrium
In the bubbly equilibrium, aggregate savings, (1 ) w t L t = , are used to …nance the purchase of capital stock, K t+1 , and the aggregate bubble B t . Hence the capital accumulation equation becomes:
where, by our normalization, b t = B t =N t now denotes the bubble per skilled worker. The absence of arbitrage opportunities for speculators implies that the dynamics of the bubble must be
Equation (26)- (27), together with (22) and (24), fully describe the dynamics of the bubbly equilibrium.
As usual, the steady state of the bubbly equilibrium satis…es b t+1 = b t and hence the "golden-rule" relation r b = n. The existence of asymptotically bubbly equilibria is ensured if the value of the bubble per skilled worker in the steady state, b; is positive. From (22) and (26), this is the case if and only if the productive rate in the bubbleless steady state lies below the golden rule interest rate, i.e.,
Again, the bubbly steady state (k b ;`b; b) can be computed sequentially as follows. Substituting n for r t+1 in (24) gives`b. With`b and r b known, the steady state counterpart of (22) uniquely determine k b . Finally, k b and`b can be substituted into the steady state counterpart of (26) to …nd b. Moreover, and as is shown in Appendix C, the bubbly steady state is determinate under condition (12) provided that k b is su¢ ciently close to k (or, equivalently, that b is su¢ ciently small). This establishes the local uniqueness of the asymptotically bubbly equilibrium.
Dynamic e¢ ciency
The central implication of the heterogenous skill model is that asset bubbles a¤ect relative wages and consumption levels through their e¤ect on the allocation of skilled workers across sectors. We focus here on the comparison of steady state consumption levels, and rely on the local stability of both equilibria to argue that, starting from k 0 su¢ ciently close to k and k b , these consumption levels will asymptotically converge towards their steady state value.
The following proposition establishes that, as a result of rising income inequalities, unskilled workers are the …rst to bear the cost of the misallocation of labor generated by asset bubbles.
Proposition 3. There exists a threshold level of the market power of …nanciers, denoted by u 2 (0; 1) ; such that the consumption of unskilled workers is lower in the bubbly than in the bubbleless steady state whenever > u . In the vicinity of = u the steady state consumption level of skilled workers is higher in the bubbly steady state than in the bubbleless steady state.
Proof. In Appendix D.
Proposition 3 identi…es a new source of breakdown of dynamic e¢ ciency under endogenous occupational choice, namely, the fact that the bubble may be harmful to unskilled workers even when it bene…ts skilled workers. This is notably the case when is higher than, but close to u . Note also that the opposite cannot occur: because all depositors are paid the same interest rate while the bubble raises wage inequalities, it cannot be that the bubble raises the consumption of the unskilled while lowering that of the skilled (relative to the bubbleless equilibrium). Importantly, the proposition does not establish an upper threshold of above which skilled workers would lose; in fact, one can easily construct examples in which the consumption of the skilled is higher in the bubbly than in the bubbleless equilibrium for all possible values of (see below); in contrast, there always is such a threshold for the unskilled.
To get further insight into the redistributive e¤ects of asset bubbles under heterogenous skills, it may be useful to draw the values of key steady state variables as a function of ; the market power of …nanciers. Our …rst example, which uses A = u = = 1, = 1=3, = 1=2; = 0:5 and n = 0:1, is depicted in Figure 4 . For all values of , the bubbly steady state (bold curves) is associated with a larger …nancial sector, lower wages and greater wage inequalities than the bubbleless steady state. Crucially, there are now two threshold levels for (instead of one as in Figure 2 ): u , above which unskilled workers asymptotically su¤er from the bubble, and s , above which skilled workers asymptotically su¤er from the bubble.
Since u < s (as is consistent with Proposition 3), there is a range of market powers within which the bubbly steady state is bene…cial to the skilled but detrimental to the unskilled, relative to the bubbleless steady state.
s need not be strictly smaller than one, as Figure 5 illustrates. This second example uses the same parameters as those of the …rst example except for the fact that we set = 1=3 and u = 1:2. In this situation, we still have a threshold u 2 (0; 1) for the unskilled, but no such a threshold for the skilled: these always bene…t from the bubble asymptotically. A central di¤erence with the previous example, and one that is responsible for this result, is that here bubbles turn out to raise the wage income of skilled workers for su¢ ciently high values of . To understand why this is the case, recall that the skilled wage is w t = k t` 1 t in equilibrium. On the one hand, the bubbly steady state has lower capital per worker than the bubbleless steady state, which pushes this wage down; on the other hand, the bubbly steady state has fewer skilled workers in the production sector, which raises their marginal product and hence pushes up the wage of skilled workers. Ultimately the impact of the bubble on the (steady state) equilibrium wage of skilled workers depends on this two forces.
When the market power of …nanciers is su¢ ciently strong, the brain drain from production to speculation that takes place in the bubbly equilibrium may cause the second e¤ect to dominate, resulting in higher wages and higher consumption levels. In other words, the model explains not only why bubbles raise income inequalities, but also how they may lead to an absolute increase in both the wage income and capital income of skilled workers. Hence 
Concluding remarks
Our paper shows that when the …nancial sector is su¢ ciently competitive then people are better o¤ in an economy with a large …nancial sector that produces and manage asset bubbles than in an economy without asset bubble and with a smaller …nancial sector. However, when …nancial market frictions are too severe, asset bubbles are associated with such a large …nan-cial sector that bubbles lose their traditional e¢ ciency properties. Moreover, asset bubbles increase wage inequalities and are primarily detrimental to low-skilled workers. From this point of view, the concern that asset bubbles are detrimental to productive and innovative activities can be justi…ed. However, our paper suggests that the main concern should be the regulation of the …nancial sector, rather than the existence of asset bubbles per se. 
Note that for both parties the gain from this ( 1)th match is higher than their outside options (i.e., 1;t+1 > ;t+1 and r t+1 1;t+1 > 0), so both agree to strike a deal at this stage. By the same logic, repeated times, both parties agree to strike a deal at the …rst match, giving the …nancier an intermediation margin:
1;t+1 =~ (r t+1 2;t+1 ) =~ 2 (r t+1 3;t+1 ) = :::
This is exactly equation (4) in the body of the paper since t+1 , the prevailing interest rate, is the one that result from (all) depositors'unit gain from their …rst bargaining round, 1;t+1 . Equation (3) is a rewriting of (4).
B. Local dynamics of the basic model Bubbleless equilibrium
We use hatted variables to denote proportional deviations of the corresponding variables from the steady state (e.g.,k t = (k t k ) =k ). Linearising (8) and (9) around (k ; l ) yields:
where
; and
We write the linearized dynamics of the model asx t+1 = Mx t , wherex t = [k t^t ] 0 and
The characteristic polynomial of M is P (p) = p 2 (1 A ) p A and has roots:
Note that both roots are real, that p 1 2 (0; 1) and that p 2 < 1 if and only if A (1 + ) > 2, which is inequality (12) in the body of the paper (when (12) is not satis…ed we have p 2 2 ( 1; 0) and hence indeterminacy). The general solution of the linearized system iŝ
where c 1 and c 2 are two numbers whose value is determined by the initial value ofk t and the terminal value of^t: Since^1 = 0 and p 2 < 1; one has c 2 = 0: Then:
Substituting this expression of c 1 into (29) yieldŝ
which gives (14) in the body of the paper.
Bubbly equilibrium
Let us …rst de…ne b and b as the same elasticities as those in (13) 
and
Note that > 1 since (k =` ) = 1 + n; (:) is decreasing in k=`(by assumption) and k b =`b < k =` (i.e., the bubble asymptotically crowds out capital per producer). Next,
where:
Finally, linearizing (16) yields:
From the three linearized di¤erence equations we can write the bubbly equilibrium in
The characteristic polynomial of N is:
We determine the location of the roots ofP (p) = 0 by drawingP (p) over ( 1; +1).
First, note that P (0) = A b b b < 0; P ( 1) = +1 and P (+1) = 1. Moreover, we have that P (1) = b A b ( 1) > 0, which implies that one of the roots (sayp 1 ) lies between 0 and 1, while another (sayp 2 ) lies in (1; +1) . The third root,p 3 , is below 1 if and only if:
When k b is close to k , our assumption throughout, is close to 1 and A b , b and b are close to A , and , respectively. At k b = k the latter inequality becomes:
and is thus satis…ed under condition (12) . This implies that there is a neighborhood of k such that when k b lies in this neighborhood the dynamics of the bubbly system has exactly one stable root. Then, the dynamics of capital in this neighborhoodk t+1 =p 1kt , which gives (19) in the body of the paper.
C. Local dynamics of the model with skill heterogeneity Bubbleless equilibrium
The bubbleless equilibrium is given by equations (22), (24) and (25) . De…ning R t 1 + r t and linearizing (22) around the bubbleless steady states gives: Finally, linearizing (25) gives:k t+1 = k t + ^t :
We obtain a two-dimensional system by substitutingR t (…rst equation) into the linearized expression for^t (second equation). In matrix form, we havex t+1 = M sxt , where:
The characteristic polynomial of M s is:
so that P s (+1) = P s ( 1) = +1, P s (0) = = { < 0 and P s (1) = (1 ) = { > 0: Hence, P s (p) = 0 has one root, p s1 , that belongs to (0; 1). The other one is strictly less than 1 if and only if P s ( 1) < 0, that is, if and only if:
(1 + ) = { > 2:
Since { 1, a su¢ cient condition for the inequality to be satis…ed is (1 + ) = > 2, that is, after rearranging,
This inequality is necessarily satis…ed since, with the production function (21), the determinacy condition (12) (our assumption throughout) gives:
while (1 ) (R ) = R > 0. Thus, in the vicinity of the steady state the bubbleless dynamics has exactly one root inside the unique circle, p s1 . This implies that the bubbleless equilibrium exists and is locally unique.
Bubbly equilibrium
The bubbly equilibrium is given by equations (22), (24) , (26) and (27). Linearizing (22) and (24) around the bubby steady states gives: 
where s (1 ) (n + ) = (1 + n) > 1 under inequality (28). Finally, (27) gives:
The linearized bubbly system is three-dimensional (sinceR t+1 can be eliminated from the system). One can thus write the bubbly equilibrium under skill heterogeneity in matrix The characteristic polynomial of N s is: Here again, the location of the roots ofP s (p) = 0 can be found by drawingP s (p) over This establishes the location of the …rst two roots,p s1 2 (0; 1) andp s2 2 (1; +1). The third root,p s3 , is necessarily negative. A necessary and su¢ cient condition forp s3 < 1 (so that the equilibrium is locally unique) is thatP s ( 1) < 0, that is,
This inequality is true provided that k b is su¢ ciently close to k (or, equivalently, provided that b is su¢ ciently small). Indeed, as k b approaches k , s and b approach 1 and , respectively, and the right hand side of the latter inequality approaches 2 (1 + ) = { .
We know from the local dynamics of the bubbleless equilibrium above that 2 (1 + ) = { is negative under condition (12) .
D. Proof of Proposition 3
In steady state, the consumption of unskilled workers is c u ( ) = w u [ + (1 ) (1 + r)],
where (w u ; r) = (w u ; r ) or w (21) and (22) and rearranging, we can rewrite the steady state wage of unskilled workers, w u ; as follows: Computing the derivative @c u (0) =@r, we …nd that it is positive whenever (r + ) = (1 + r) > = (1 ). This inequality is satis…ed at r = r , while (r + ) = (1 + r) is increasing in r;
hence c u (0) is increasing in r over r ; r b , which implies that c 
